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Antitrust Law 






Reverse-payment patent settlements (commonly referred to as 
“pay for delay”) have been used to settle patent litigation between 
brand-name drug companies and generic manufacturers; the brand 
pays the generic company for an agreed-upon delay in entry of the 
generic drug to market.2 In its 2010 report, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) estimated that pay-for-delay agreements 
would cost consumers $35 billion over the next ten years.3 
Members of the FTC urged Congress to end the sharing of 
monopoly profits between brand and generic companies and 
accelerate access to lower-priced generic drugs.4 Unfortunately, 
nearly ten years later, no such legislation has become law. 
In May 2019, the FTC reported, based on its most recently 
released data, a significant reduction in the pay-for-delay 
agreements most likely to be anticompetitive.5 This Chapter 
examines the legal standard applied to pay-for- delay settlements 
in the United States. It argues that pay-for-delay settlements may 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Laura Karas, Gerald Anderson & Robin 
Feldman, Pharmaceutical “Pay-for-Delay” Reexamined: A Dwindling 
Practice or a Persistent Problem?, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 959 (2020).  
2 See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., RL32377, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: LEGISLATIVE CHANGES 
AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 13 (2004); C. Scott Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1556–57 (2006). 
3 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-
OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 2 (2010). 
4 How Pay-for-Delay Settlements Make Consumers and the Federal 
Government Pay More for Much Needed Drugs: Prepared Statement of 
the Fed. Trade Comm’n Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, & 
Consumer Prot. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 4, 7 
(2009) (statement of Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n). 
5 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Issues FY 2016 Report 
on Branded Drug Firms’ Patent Settlements with Generic Competitors 
(May 23, 2019). 
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not be on the decline, as the FTC claimed, but rather that they have 
evolved to favor categories of value transfer less likely to attract 
antitrust scrutiny. It concludes with a discussion of pay-for-delay 
bills under consideration in Congress and offers several policy 
proposals at the nexus of patent law and antitrust that strike at the 
heart of the pay-for-delay problem. 
 
The Legal Approach to Pay-for-Delay Settlements 
 
In 2013, the Supreme Court addressed pay-for-delay 
agreements head-on in FTC v. Actavis.6 There, a brand-drug 
company, Solvay Pharmaceuticals, settled patent-infringement 
litigation in 2006 with several generic-drug companies, including 
Actavis, which sought to market a generic version of Solvay’s 
brand drug AndroGel.7 In the settlement, Solvay paid tens of 
millions of dollars to the generic-drug companies in return for a 
delay in marketing the generic product.8 Actavis, in particular, 
agreed to postpone bringing its generic to market until 2015, nine 
years after the settlement but prior to the expiration of Solvay’s 
patent.9 This is a fairly common example of a pay- for-delay 
settlement. 
Reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s dismissal of the complaint,10 
the Supreme Court held that such settlements could not be 
immunized from antitrust laws simply because the settlements did 
not extend beyond the original term or earnings potential of the 
patent.11 In the majority opinion, Justice Breyer underscored the 
need to consider both patent and antitrust policies in determining 
the power conferred by a patent and, therefore, in evaluating the 
legality of patent settlements.12 
The Supreme Court declined to label a pay-for-delay 
settlement presumptively illegal.13 Instead, it held that a 
 
6 570 U.S. 136, 140–41 (2013). 
7 Id. at 144–45. 
8 Id. at 145. 
9 Id. 
10 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312, 
1315 (11th Cir. 2012). 
11 Actavis, 570 U.S. at 148–49. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 158–59. 
Vol. 5 The Judges’ Book 7 
settlement in which the reverse payment appears “large and 
unjustified” should be subject to a “rule-of-reason” legal 
analysis,14 which permits consideration of “legitimate 
justifications.”15 The Court did, however, open the door to a more 
streamlined version of the rule-of-reason test, noting that trial 
courts could “structure” the rule-of-reason test to fit varying 
circumstances.16 
While the Court’s decision amounted to an important 
rejection of the Eleventh Circuit’s “scope of the patent” test, 
Actavis did not categorically prohibit pay-for-delay deals and 
arguably did not go far enough to address drug companies’ 
dedication to circumventing the antitrust rules in their favor. The 
rule of reason promises a careful assessment but runs the risk that 
its nuanced approach will amount to leniency.17 In the context of 
pay-for-delay, the courts’ attempts at a balanced evaluation may 
become self-defeating if drug companies veil anticompetitive 
settlements with procompetitive “window dressing” in order to 
avoid an antitrust violation.18 
Factors that Justice Breyer articulated as suggestive of 
anticompetitive effect (payments large in size and scope relative 
to litigation costs and independent of services for which a payment 
might be compensation)19 provide guideposts to detect a 
potentially unlawful agreement but fall short of bright-line rules. 
Nevertheless, since the Court’s decision in Actavis, the FTC has 
brought suit and enforcement actions against several 
pharmaceutical companies, including Impax, Teva, and Endo, for 
unlawful pay-for-delay settlements.20 
 
14 Id. at 158. 
15 Id. at 156. 
16 Id. at 159–60; see also Robin Feldman, Ending Patent Exceptionalism 
& Structuring the Rule of Reason: The Supreme Court Opens the Door 
for Both, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74 (2014). 
17 Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. 
L.J. 2079, 2107–08 (1999). 
18 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE 
AND EXECUTION 8 (2005). 
19 Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159. 
20 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Concludes that Impax 
Entered into Illegal Pay-for-Delay Agreement (Mar. 29, 2019); Press 
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Enters Global Settlement to Resolve 
Reverse-Payment Charges Against Teva (Feb. 19, 2019); Press Release, 
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The Evolution of Pay-for-Delay Agreements since Actavis 
 
One regulatory response to pay-for-delay agreements has been 
to mandate, pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (“Medicare 
Modernization Act”)21 reporting to the FTC and Department of 
Justice of pharmaceutical-patent settlements between brand and 
generic companies in the Hatch-Waxman regulatory system. 
Similarly, the Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, signed into 
law in 2018, expanded mandatory reporting to settlement 
agreements between makers of biologics and biosimilars licensed 
under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act.22 
The Medicare Modernization Act enables the FTC to track 
pay-for-delay settlements over time. At first glance, the FTC’s 
reported data present a picture of successful deterrence since 
Actavis: the number of potential pay-for- delay settlements 
decreased from a high of forty in fiscal year (FY) 2012 to 
fourteen in FY 2015.23 Yet the number of all settlements has 
continued to increase, with 232 settlement agreements in 2016, up 
from 170 in 2015.24 The suggestion that pay-for-delay deals may 
 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. Agrees to Abandon 
Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Agreements to Settle FTC Charges; FTC 
Refiles Suits Against Generic Defendants (Jan. 23, 2017). 
21 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111–18, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–64 
(2003). 
22 FED. TRADE COMM’N, MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND 
IMPROVEMENT ACT REQUIRES DRUG COMPANIES TO FILE CERTAIN 
AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2019). 
23 FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED 
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 
2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2016 (2019) [hereinafter 
FTC FY 2016 REPORT]. 
24 FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 23, at 4; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, 
IMPROVEMENT, AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF 
AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2015 (2017). 
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be declining rests on an inability to categorize the agreements. 
Since 2010, most agreements between brand and generics fall 
into a nebulous category that I have called “Category X,” in 
which the generic agrees to delay entry, but the FTC does not see 
a flow of value from the brand to the generic.25 The number of 
Category X agreements increased in 2016 to 151, rising from 126 
the year before and a mere 75 the year the Supreme Court decided 
Actavis.26  
Why would generics enter into these agreements in increasing 
numbers if they stand to receive no benefit?27 The answer is that, 
mindful of the Supreme Court decision in Actavis, drug companies 
have crafted settlements that comply with the Court’s guidance but 
that may still amount to anticompetitive behavior. Fourteen 
settlements contained a form of “possible compensation” along 
with a restriction on generic entry; nine of the fourteen settlements 
contained a provision that the brand company would not distribute 
an authorized generic via a third party, which the FTC admits 
“could have the same effect” as an agreement by the brand 
company not to sell its own authorized generic.28 Three of the 
fourteen contained a potentially anticompetitive “declining 
royalty structure” that involves a reduction in royalty payments to 
the brand company if it launches an authorized generic.29 An 
agreement not to compete with a generic paired with delayed 
generic entry has a similar impact on competition as direct 
compensation for delayed generic entry. If the thirty settlements 
with a pay-for-delay structure and the fourteen settlements 
containing “possible compensation” are combined,30 the total 
number of potentially problematic agreements in FY 2016 exceeds 
that of the peak year 2012. 
 
25 Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay-for-
Delay, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 249, 24–65 (2019). 
26 FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 23, at 2; Feldman & Misra, supra 
note 25, at 282. 
27 See Feldman & Misra, supra note 25. 
28 See FTC FY 2016 Report, supra note 23, at 1–2. 
29 Id. at 2. 
30 Id. at 1 (explaining that three of the thirty settlements containing a 
restriction on generic entry and a form of explicit compensation also 
contained a form of “possible compensation,” and so are counted in both 
figures). 
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Other exotic variants exist, including acceleration clauses, in 
which the generic can move up the date of entry based on events 
such as the release of an authorized generic or the entry of another 
generic.31 Acceleration clauses can discourage other generic 
companies from entering32 because they know that when they get 
to market, they will face immediate competition from the settling 
generic.33 In the most recent year of FTC reports, 2016, 76% of 
settlements between brand-name and generic companies contained 
some form of acceleration clause.34 In hints of other 
anticompetitive aspects, the FTC reported that more than 90% of 
all settlements between brands and generics involved the generic 
receiving rights to patents not subject to any litigation between the 
two companies.35 Additional rights such as these can be the 
vehicles for transferring value or for sharing markets. 
Hence, there is good reason to believe that anticompetitive 
pay-for-delay agreements continue to be reached in the United 
States post-Actavis. A reduction in explicit payments to figures 
below $7 million can likely be attributed to Justice Breyer’s 
emphasis on the size of the reverse payment in Actavis.36 
However, a small reverse payment should not immunize 
anticompetitive behavior any more than does allowing generic 
entry prior to expiration of the patent in question. The “scope of 
the patent” test has effectively been replaced by a “size of the 
payment” test, permitting brand companies with more complex 
deals but modest explicit payments to stay under the radar. 
Evidence shows that settlements involving delayed generic 
entry now resolve patent-challenge proceedings before the recently 
created Patent Trial and Appeal Board,37 which may allow some of 
 
31 Lizbeth Hasse, When IP Settlements Create Antitrust Headaches, 
NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 21, 2016). 
32 Michael A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7, 37–
38 (2014). 
33 Id. at 28–29. 
34 See FTC FY 2016 REPORT, supra note 23, at 3. 
35 Id. at 2 (“215 of the 232 final settlements involve the generic 
manufacturer receiving rights to patents that were not the subject of any 
litigation between the brand manufacturer and that generic 
manufacturer.”). 
36 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013). 
37 Erik Hovenkamp & Jorge Lemus, Delayed Entry Settlements at the 
Patent Office, 54 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 30, 30 (2018). 
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these settlements to escape detection (though the FTC has declared 
that settlements before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board fall 
under the purview of the Medicare Modernization Act’s reporting 
mandate).38 It is essential for the FTC and the courts to correctly 
label settlements as unlawful pay-for-delay agreements when 
appropriate, regardless of the venue in which the agreement is 
reached and despite the strategic construction of settlements with 




Several substantive changes to the antitrust approach to pay-
for-delay settlements can help ameliorate the problem. First, the 
key criterion in determining an unlawful agreement should be the 
existence of a restriction on generic entry—not the size or 
presence of a value transfer—considered in light of the strength of 
the category of patent in question. Arguably, pay-for-delay is only 
a problem if the patent is invalid or aimed at the wrong product, 
since the generic could enter the market immediately upon that 
determination. Pay-for-delay agreements tend to settle litigation 
over a “secondary patent,” which covers some feature of a drug 
other than the active pharmaceutical ingredient.39 Evidence shows 
that secondary patents form part of a deliberate strategy to 
prolong a drug’s effective period of patent protection.40 Though 
few patent cases reach a final decision on validity,41 secondary 
 
38 Jamie Towey & Brad Albert, Then, Now, and Down the Road: Trends 
in Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements After FTC v. Actavis, FTC BLOG 
(May 28, 2019, 12:23 PM). 
39 Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and 
Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” 
Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2012, at 1. 
40 María José Abud, Bronwyn Hall & Christian Helmers, An Empirical 
Analysis of Primary and Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents in Chile, 
PLOS ONE, Apr. 2015, at 1, 3–4; Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, 
Secondary Patenting of Branded Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of How 
Patents on Two HIV Drugs Could Be Extended for Decades, 31 HEALTH 
AFF. 2286, 2286–87 (2012); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, 
When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 613, 615 (2011); Kapczynski et al., supra note 39, at 2. 
41 See Roger Allan Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. 71, 88 (2013). 
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drug patents are frequently found invalid when challenged.42 
Thus, secondary patents may over-reward a pharmaceutical 
drug’s actual innovative contribution with unwarranted 
extensions of patent protection. The category of the patent in 
question in a pay-for-delay agreement is thus highly germane to 
an examination of the potential illegality of the deal. 
Next, the United States should move closer to a presumptive 
standard in evaluating pay-for-delay settlements in order to 
achieve more efficient and effective antitrust enforcement. The 
pay-for-delay bills introduced in Congress will help achieve that 
goal, as would adopting a standard similar to that of the European 
Union that emphasizes an agreement’s aim to restrict competition 
rather than downstream effects on the marketplace.43 Although 
intent can be difficult to establish under U.S. law, those difficulties 
can be overcome by designing standards that use objective criteria 
as a means of inferring a company’s likely intent. The category of 
patent and the failure to sue on the core chemical or biological 
patent could be part of those objective criteria. 
Finally, regulatory disincentives may be a more effective 
deterrent of pay- for-delay deals than monetary penalties. For 
example, the FTC and FDA could jointly prohibit a generic 
company that is found to have participated in a pay-for- delay deal 
from eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period for any 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that it files in the 
ensuing five years. Without exclusive marketing rights as the first 
generic to file an ANDA, the generic company stands to lose the 
bulk of its profits on any generic drug launched in that five-year 
period.44 Regulatory disincentives can counterbalance the 
 
42 See, e.g., In re Janssen Biotech, Inc., 880 F.3d 1315, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2018); Jeppe Brinck-Jensen & Kamilla Kelm Demant, Quetiapine Patent 
Invalidated—Danish Court Follows Suit, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 7, 2016); 
Jessica Hodgson, AstraZeneca Suffers U.S. Patent Blow, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 2, 2013, 4:37 AM). 
43 Eur. Comm’n, Decision of 9 July 2014, at 240–41 C(2014); Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union Art. 101(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 88. 
44 A generic company seeking FDA approval to market a generic drug 
before the brand drug’s patents have expired must file a “paragraph IV 
certification” with the FDA, asserting that the brand drug’s patents listed 
within the FDA’s Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations (also known as the Orange Book) are invalid, 
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“carrots” in the Hatch-Waxman Act, thereby rewarding 




Settlement agreements to end patent disputes are common and 
not in and of themselves indicative or suggestive of antitrust 
infringement. Often, settlements are a favored alternative to 
continuing costly litigation. However, pay-for-delay settlements 
come at a steep cost to consumers by delaying the entry of less-
expensive generic alternatives to brand drugs. The ability to wield 
competition laws effectively against these settlements is of major 
importance to regulators, policymakers, and consumers. Shifting 
the focus of antitrust scrutiny to restrictions on generic entry vis-
à-vis the strength of the category of underlying patent, and 
creating disincentives for generic companies to agree to pay-for- 
delay deals, will help grease the wheels of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and accelerate the path to affordable drug prices for U.S. patients. 
  
 
unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale 
of the generic drug product for which the application is submitted. 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). The first paragraph IV ANDA applicant 
to challenge a patent is eligible for 180 days of exclusive rights to market 
the generic drug upon FDA approval. Id. Currently, this statutory 
incentive is retained even when the patent owner does not initiate suit 
against the ANDA applicant, or when the patent infringement suit is 
subsequently settled. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY: 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10 (2017). 
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